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ABSTRACT
Background Concerns have been raised over
competing interests (CoI) among academics during the
2009 to 2010 A/H1N1 pandemic. Media reporting can
inﬂuence public anxiety and demand for pharmaceutical
products. We assessed CoI of academics providing media
commentary during the early stages of the pandemic.
Methods We performed a retrospective content
analysis of UK newspaper articles on A/H1N1 inﬂuenza,
examining quoted sources. We noted when academics
made a risk assessment of the pandemic and compared
this with ofﬁcial estimations. We also looked for
promotion or rejection of the use of neuraminidase
inhibitors or H1N1-speciﬁc vaccine. We independently
searched for CoI for each academic.
Results Academics were the second most frequently
quoted source after Ministers of Health. Where both
academics and ofﬁcial agencies estimated the risk of
H1N1, one in two academics assessed the risk as higher
than ofﬁcial predictions. For academics with CoI, the
odds of a higher risk assessment were 5.8 times greater
than those made by academics without CoI (Wald
p value=0.009). One in two academics commenting on
the use of neuraminidase inhibitors or vaccine had CoI.
The odds of CoI in academics promoting the use of
neuraminidase inhibitors were 8.4 times greater than for
academics not commenting on their use (Fisher’s exact
p=0.005).
Conclusions There is evidence of CoI among
academics providing media commentary during the early
H1N1 pandemic. Heightened risk assessments, combined
with advocacy for pharmaceutical products to counter
this risk, may lead to increased public anxiety and
demand. Academics should declare, and journalists
report, relevant CoI for media interviews.
INTRODUCTION
The UK spent an estimated one billion pounds on
pharmaceutical products during the 2009 to 2010
A/H1N1 inﬂuenza pandemic, including neuramin-
idase inhibitors (NI) and H1N1-speciﬁc vaccine.1
Pharmaceutical companies made proﬁts of 4.5–6.5
billion pounds from H1N1 vaccines alone.2 This
was despite the evaluation of the pandemic as less
severe than previous pandemics3 4 and uncertainty
over the effectiveness of neuraminidase inhibitors
(a type of antiviral medication) in reducing trans-
mission and complications of inﬂuenza.5
In the postpandemic period, there were signiﬁ-
cant concerns about competing interests (CoI)
among experts on inﬂuential advisory committees,
including the WHO Emergency Committee.2 6 7
Members of these committees have been linked to
manufacturers of both neuraminidase inhibitors
and inﬂuenza vaccines.7 8 There have been repeated
calls for greater transparency around the potential
inﬂuence of the pharmaceutical industry on the
decisions made by these committees.2 6 7 9
Public health academics are often asked to
provide commentary and analysis on emerging
health risks by the media. Media coverage of health
issues has been shown to inﬂuence the public’s per-
ception of risk, demand for new drugs and policy
decisions.10–13 In the UK, extensive media advo-
cacy of the breast cancer drug trastuzumab
(Herceptin) resulted in a ‘fast-track’ approval from
the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence,14 but there was subsequent debate over
the cost-effectiveness of the drug.15 It has been sug-
gested that optimistic media portrayals may be
more successful for pharmaceutical companies than
explicit promotional campaigns as “the message is
separated from an obvious marketing agenda and
often includes a trusted voice, such as a university-
based researcher. Paradoxically, this trust is based in
part on a belief in the perceived independence of
university researchers”.16 Like those on advisory
committees, academics quoted in the media may
also have possible CoI. Media commentaries, there-
fore, represent an alternative route to exert pres-
sure on public demand and one in which CoI are
not routinely declared.
We set out to examine media commentary on
A/H1N1 inﬂuenza provided by academics during
the period in which the UK government decided
its policy on public provision of NI and
H1N1-speciﬁc vaccine (NI/vaccine). We then inde-
pendently searched for CoI for each academic to
determine whether commentary from academics
with and without CoI was signiﬁcantly different.
METHODS
Design and setting
This study was a retrospective content analysis of
UK newspaper reporting. We excluded television
and radio coverage, as audiovisual reporting is
often limited by time constraints and presents less
divergent viewpoints and in-depth analysis com-
pared with print media.17 18
Selection of newspaper articles
Figure 1 shows the ﬂow of articles through the
study. We used the Nexis-UK database, which pro-
vides full-text access to all UK national newspapers.
Twelve UK national newspapers were included in
the sample ( January 2009 circulation ﬁgures are
given in parentheses19): Daily Mirror (1 366 891),
Sunday Mirror (1 244 007), The Sun (3 146 006),
News of the World (3 031 025), Daily Mail
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(2 200 398), The Mail on Sunday (2 134 809), The Guardian
(358 844), The Independent (215 504), The Observer (427 867),
Daily Telegraph (783 210), The Times (617 483) and The
Sunday Times (1 198 984). These were selected in order to
ensure coverage from tabloid, middle-market and broadsheet
publications, daily and Sunday newspapers, and left and right
political orientations so that a range of perspectives and report-
ing styles were represented. This typology has been used in pre-
vious content analyses.20 21
The database was searched using the following terms (an
exclamation mark is used as a truncator in this database):
H1N1, Inﬂuenza A, Swine !ﬂu!, Pandemic !ﬂu!, Pig !ﬂu!. Only
articles that contained at least three mentions of the search
terms were eligible for inclusion in order to select articles where
H1N1 inﬂuenza was the main theme. Articles with a different
focus entirely, such as business, sports and non-news articles like
obituaries, were excluded. Search dates were between 20 April
and 5 July 2009, the period in which the major decisions on
Figure 1 Flow of articles through study.
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pharmaceuticals as part of the pandemic response were taken by
the UK government. Key events and policy decisions within this
period are summarised in table 1.1 22 News coverage dropped
off considerably after this period.20
Using these criteria, 712 articles were eligible for inclusion.
These were extracted into Microsoft Word and screened by one
of the authors. Duplicate articles from later editions of the
newspapers and any remaining articles as per exclusion criteria
above were excluded, leaving 425 articles in the ﬁnal sample.
These provided a good coverage of formats, frequencies and
political orientation, taking into account the circulation ﬁgures
above (ﬁgure 1).
Coding framework
Each article was assessed independently by two authors using a
standardised coding framework consisting of two sections.
The ﬁrst section categorised the sources quoted in each
article. The main categories consisted of Health Secretary/
Minister (of England and the Devolved Administrations—Wales,
Scotland and Northern Ireland); Department of Health (of
England and the Devolved Administrations); Chief Medical
Ofﬁcer (of England and the Devolved Administrations); World
Health Organization (WHO); the UK’s Health Protection
Agency (HPA), the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control
(CDC); pharmaceutical company representative; and named
academic (deﬁned here as a researcher or academic clinician
afﬁliated with a higher educational body or research institute in
the article).
The second section looked in greater detail at those articles
that quoted academic sources. First, we examined whether aca-
demics made a risk assessment of the emerging pandemic. For
example, quotes such as “this is going to affect millions of
people in England” or “thousands of people could die from this
virus” would be a risk assessment. We then checked whether the
academic cited ofﬁcial ﬁgures or whether there was a risk
assessment made by an ofﬁcial body relevant to the UK popula-
tion quoted within the same article (deﬁned as WHO, Health
Secretary/Minister(s), Chief Medical Ofﬁcer(s), Department(s)
of Health or HPA). Table 1 presents examples of risk assess-
ments from these agencies during the study period. We used the
ofﬁcial risk assessments as a benchmark to measure each aca-
demic risk assessment: judging whether it concurred with the
ofﬁcial estimate, or was higher or lower (ie, implying more or
less risk to the public).
All quotes by academics were then examined for reference to
the use of NI or inﬂuenza vaccine. Those that made reference to
NI/vaccine were further analysed as to whether they promoted
or rejected the use of these products. The analysis was per-
formed according to a pre-agreed consensus on terms.
‘Promotion’ was deﬁned as advocacy of the effectiveness, need
for or supply shortages of NI/vaccine. Conversely, ‘rejection’
referred to statements highlighting the adverse effects, ineffect-
iveness of or lack of need for NI/vaccine.
The coding framework was piloted on 20 articles by both
coders, with subsequent minor modiﬁcations made to deﬁni-
tions before coding of the complete data set. Cohen’s kappa was
calculated to determine inter-rater agreement between the quali-
tative measures of risk assessment and promotion/rejection of
pharmaceutical products.23 24 Disagreements between coders
were assessed by a third researcher for ﬁnal arbitration.
Microsoft Excel was used for all coding and calculations.
Evidence of CoI
For each named academic, we performed a comprehensive
search for CoI based on the protocol from a recent study exam-
ining CoI in authors of clinical practice guidelines.25 This was
undertaken by two researchers who did not take part in the
coding in order to minimise bias. We used the International
Committee of Medical Journal Editors’ deﬁnition that
“Conﬂicts of interests exists when an author (…) has ﬁnancial
Table 1 Key events, official risk assessments and UK policy decisions during study period
Date (2009) Event/policy decision
Week of 20
April
First human cases of H1N1 confirmed in Mexico, the USA and Canada.
24 April HPA press release: “The mild illness reported to date and the limited evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission suggest that the immediate
level of threat to public health is very limited”.
26 April UK government agrees to containment measures as part of its emergency response, including treatment of suspected cases and their close contacts with
neuraminidase inhibitors without waiting for diagnostic confirmation.
27 April Confirmation of first UK cases. Minister of Health issues statement: “The range of symptoms in the people affected is similar to those of regular human
seasonal influenza. It is important to note that, apart from in Mexico, all those infected with the virus have experienced mild symptoms and made a full
recovery”.
29 April WHO states, “It is possible that the full clinical spectrum of this disease goes from mild illness to severe disease. We need to continue to monitor the
evolution of the situation...”. UK government decides to increase the national stockpile of neuraminidase inhibitors from 33.5 million to 50 million doses.
1 May HPA confirms human-to-human transmission in UK, stating: “At this stage, we still only have two cases of human to human transmission in the UK. This
does not yet represent sustained human to human transmission. The risk to the general public is still very low”.
11 May UK government takes decision to purchase sufficient H1N1-specific vaccine for 45% of the population.
11 June WHO confirms start of a global pandemic, stating “we have good reason to believe that this pandemic, at least in its early days, will be of moderate
severity. Worldwide, the number of deaths is small. [..]..we do not expect to see a sudden and dramatic jump in the number of severe or fatal infections”.
15 June DH statement: “The localised cases of swine flu found in the UK have so far been generally mild in most people, but are proving to be severe in a small
minority of cases”.
17 June WHO welcomes donation by Sanofi-Aventis of 100 million doses of H1N1 vaccine for low-income countries.
26 June GlaxoSmithKline and Baxter Healthcare contracted to provide a total of 132 million doses of H1N1-specific vaccine, sufficient for two doses for the whole
UK population.
2 July UK government changes to ‘treatment’ phase in its emergency response, where prophylaxis with neuraminidase inhibitors would be provided to those in
high-risk groups only. HPA press release states: “Once the virus is widespread within the community, the value of antivirals in terms of slowing the spread
of the disease or offering individual protection is greatly reduced”.
DH, Department of Health (England); HPA, Health Protection Agency.
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or personal relationships that inappropriately inﬂuence (bias) his
or her actions)”.26 For each academic, we looked for associa-
tions with pharmaceutical or biotechnology companies, in the
form of grants (including research), honorariums, speakers’ fees,
consultant/adviser/employee relationships and stock owner-
ship.25 These could be personal, indicating beneﬁt to that indi-
vidual (eg, honorariums), or non-personal, indicating beneﬁt to
a department or organisation for which an academic has man-
agerial responsibility (eg, research grants).16 We searched for
CoI from the 4 years before the start of the pandemic, that is,
March 2005 to March 2009. This is consistent with the WHO’s
standard that CoI should be declared if incurred in the 4 years
before acting in an expert advisory role.25 27
For each academic, we made the following searches in a
sequential manner, stopping after each stage if a CoI was
identiﬁed:
▸ The CoI statements (where available) for four major scientiﬁc
advisory committees relevant to this issue: Joint Committee
on Vaccination and Immunisation (UK), Scientiﬁc Advisory
Group on Emergencies (UK), WHO Emergency Committee
and WHO Strategic Advisory Group of Experts.
▸ Funding sources detailed on the individual’s proﬁle page on
the website of afﬁliated institution.
▸ A general internet search using Google linking “(name of
academic)” with respectively “vaccine”, “neuraminidase
inhibitor”, “antiviral”, “Oseltamivir”, “Zanamivir” and the
name of the main pharmaceutical companies producing neur-
aminidase inhibitors (Roche, GlaxoSmithKline) and inﬂuenza
vaccine (Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline, Baxter International,
Sanoﬁ-Pasteur). The list of manufacturers was obtained
through the electronic Medicines Compendium (http://www.
emc.medicines.org.uk).
▸ CoI and funding declarations on all publications in the past
4 years. These were identiﬁed through the PubMed/Medline
database.
Two authors identiﬁed CoI, and a separate author veriﬁed the
presence of CoI.
We calculated the likelihood of a risk assessment being higher
than ofﬁcial estimates if it was made by an academic with CoI
compared with those without CoI. As some academics made
multiple risk assessments, we used a variant of the generalised
linear model (generalised estimating equations, using a binary
logistic link function, with an exchange correlation matrix) to
take account of clustering.28 We also calculated the likelihood of
an academic who promoted or rejected the use of NI/vaccine
having CoI compared with academics who provided general
commentary, using Fisher’s exact test. All statistics were calcu-
lated in SPSS V.19.
RESULTS
Quoted sources
Ministers of Health were the most frequently quoted sources
(144/425, 33.9% of articles), while academics were the second
most commonly quoted (29.7%, 126/425). Other common
sources included WHO (27.8%, 118/425), Departments of
Health (21.6%, 92/425), HPA (19.1%, 81/425), Chief Medical
Ofﬁcers (16.2%, 69/425) and CDC (5.6%, 24/425).
Pharmaceutical companies were quoted in just eight articles
(1.9%). A total of 61 named academics were quoted within the
sample.
Risk assessments
Academics made 74 risk assessments, over half of which were
higher than with those made by ofﬁcial agencies in the same
article (59.5%, 44/74). In nearly a quarter, 23.0%, 17/74), aca-
demics concurred with ofﬁcial risk assessments and in 17.6%
(13/74), academics estimated the risk as lower. Table 2 gives
some examples of these different categories of risk assessments.
Use of NI/vaccine
Twenty academics commented speciﬁcally on the use of NI/
vaccine in 36 articles (8.5% of total articles). Ten academics
(50%) promoted the use of NI whereas four speciﬁcally rejected
their use (20%). Nine academics (45%) promoted the use of a
vaccine, while none rejected its use. Three academics (15%)
promoted the use of both NI and vaccine. Examples of quotes
for these categories are illustrated in table 3. Cohen’s kappa for
inter-rater agreement was 0.66 (values between 0.61 and 0.80
indicate substantial inter-rater agreement).24
Competing interests
A total of 61 named academics were quoted within the sample.
We identiﬁed CoI in a third of these academics (29.5%, 18/61),
through CoI declarations for scientiﬁc advisory committees (5),
proﬁle pages (2), internet searches (9) and publications (2).
Most CoI were personal in nature (13/18, 72.2%), consisting of
paid consultancies or advisory roles, directorships or stock in
companies specialising in antiviral products. Seven CoI were
non-personal (38.9%), relating to research grants or commercial
Table 2 Examples of risk assessments made by academics and official agencies, by category assigned to academic risk assessment
Official risk assessment Academic risk assessment
Higher than official
agencies
“..between 400 000 and 800 000 people [become] ill in an average flu
season, but [at the peak of a pandemic] you would probably be into
several million cases” [Chief Medical Officer]
“The virus [is] likely to be two to three times more deadly than seasonal
flu...the pandemic could mean that 25–35 per cent of the population
would fall ill within three or four months, placing severe strain on the
NHS”.
Concurring with
official agencies
Minister of Health: “There is no cause for anyone to feel there is going to
be any danger to them at this stage... Pandemics come along every
20 years and the present outbreak [is] not inevitably going to move to level
six”, however [the Minister of Health] indicated that he thought it likely
that the alert level might rise to pandemic.”
“We haven’t yet identified any features that give us cause for concern,
or that indicate high virulence [...]. It is important that people keep a
sense of perspective, because what we observe is what may lead to a
pandemic. We don’t know that it will lead to a pandemic, although
many of us think that this is highly likely”.
Lower than official
agencies
“Even though the fatality rate is relatively low we will see a lot of people
dying because of the large number of people being infected. As more and
more cases are reported in the US, we are starting to see some
hospitalisations and more severe cases. We may see the same pattern in
the UK”. [World Health Organization]
“This might not be any more virulent than normal seasonal flu
infections. We feel reassured that if this develops into a pandemic it
might not be a particularly severe one”.
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work funded by pharmaceutical companies. Two academics held
both personal and non-personal CoI.
Out of the 44 risk assessments that were higher than ofﬁcial
sources, 35 were made by academics with CoI. In contrast, 10
of the 30 risk assessments that concurred with or were lower
than ofﬁcial sources were made by academics with CoI. As
several academics made more than one risk assessment, data
were ﬁtted using generalised equalising equations. In this ana-
lysis, risk assessments were categorised as either being higher
than ofﬁcial estimates or concurring with/lower than the ofﬁcial
position, forming a binary dependent variable. The best-ﬁtting
model revealed that for risk assessments made by academics
with CoI the odds of a higher risk assessment were 5.8 times
greater compared with assessments made by academics without
CoI (Wald p value=0.009).
Out of the 20 academics who commented on the use of NI/
vaccine in the pandemic, one in two had CoI (10, 50%). This is a
higher proportion than the one in three academics on the WHO’s
Emergency Committee advisory group who declared CoI.8
When we correlated CoI by type of comment, 7 out of 10 aca-
demics (70%) promoting the use of NI had CoI compared with 10
out of 47 (21.3%) of academics not commenting on their use
(table 4). The odds of COI in academics promoting the use of NI
were 8.4 times greater than for academics not commenting on the
use of NI (Fisher’s exact p=0.005). The odds of CoI in academics
rejecting the use of NI were not signiﬁcantly different to the odds in
those not commenting their use (Fisher’s exact p=1.0). Five out of
nine academics (55.6%) promoting the use of a vaccine had a CoI
compared with 13 out of 52 (25.0%) not commenting on its use, a
non-signiﬁcant trend (Fisher’s exact p=0.11).
Only three articles in the entire sample noted that the quoted
academics had a potential conﬂict of interest, with one colum-
nist commenting that, “it would be helpful if newspapers
informed us of these things”.
DISCUSSION
During the period in which the UK government took its major
decisions on pharmaceutical policy, one in two academics com-
menting on NI/vaccine use in UK national newspapers had CoI.
The odds of CoI in academics promoting the use of NI were 8.4
times greater than for academics not commenting on the use of
NI. If academics with CoI made an assessment of the risk of the
pandemic, the odds of this risk assessment being higher than
ofﬁcial sources were 5.8 times greater compared with assess-
ments made by academics without CoI.
CoI among academics on inﬂuential advisory committees
have led to intense debate worldwide.2 6 7 This study estimates,
for the ﬁrst time, the prevalence of CoI among academics pro-
viding media commentary during the early H1N1 pandemic.
We combined a rigorous search for CoI with a comprehensive
sample of nationally prominent media during a critical policy-
making period. Our ﬁndings are based on a small sample,
however, and should be viewed as a scoping study. They are cor-
roborated by a study by Moynihan et al29 examining news
coverage of three medications for non-communicable diseases,
which found that out of 170 stories citing an expert or a scien-
tiﬁc study, 50% (85) cited those with a ﬁnancial tie to the drug
manufacturer. Indeed, a study looking at UK newspapers’ repre-
sentations of the H1N1 pandemic found little discussion of the
proﬁts that pharmaceutical companies would make from the
development of a H1N1-speciﬁc vaccine and few articles
describing the potential side effects of vaccines.20
It is clear from our results that academics constitute an
accessible and trusted source for journalists. Academics were
the second most commonly quoted source after Ministers of
Health, and therefore hold a unique and powerful position
for communication on emerging public health issues.
However, in a third of cases, academics estimated the risk of
the emerging pandemic as higher than ofﬁcial sources. We
recognise that academics may be involved in modelling out-
comes based on early estimates and may therefore predict
higher risks than is borne out by more comprehensive data.
In addition, journalists may seek out divergent viewpoints in
order to provide balance within a story or to increase its
newsworthiness. However, consensus among risk assessors
during public health emergencies is important to decrease
public anxiety, increase the effectiveness of risk communica-
tion and promote adherence to personal protective mea-
sures.30–32 We would suggest that this responsibility extends
to the media as well, who may need to balance their investi-
gative role with the need to provide a clear and consistent
message during the early stages of a public health emergency.
Indeed, content analyses of UK20 and European media report-
ing on H1N1 inﬂuenza33 found predominantly factual report-
ing with little evidence of sensationalism.
Our results provide some evidence that the provision of
higher risk assessments and the promotion of NI are associated
with CoI among academics. These add to the growing body of
literature highlighting the potential inﬂuence of the pharmaceut-
ical industry on policy decisions through multiple avenues,
including advisory committees6, drafting of guidelines25 and
Table 4 Number of academics with competing interests by type
of comment
Type of comment
Number of
academics
Number with
competing interests (%)
Promoting the use of NI 10 7 (70)
Rejecting the use of NI 4 1 (25)
Not commenting on the use of NI 47 10 (21.3)
Promoting the use of vaccine 9 5 (55.6)
Rejecting the use of vaccine 0 0 (0)
Not commenting on the use of
vaccine
52 13 (25.5)
NI, neuraminidase inhibitors.
Table 3 Comments promoting or rejecting the use of
neuraminidase inhibitors or vaccine
Type of comment Example
Promoting the use of
neuraminidase inhibitors
“There is no doubt Tamiflu [oseltamivir] will
help”.
“There is an issue of Tamiflu resistance. All
things being equal, it would be nice to get as
much Relenza [zanamivir] as we can get our
hands on”.
Promoting the use of vaccine “I think by far the safer option is to wait for the
development of a vaccine which will almost
certainly be around by the autumn”.
“Vaccines are our real hope”.
Rejecting the use of
neuraminidase inhibitors
“At present it [Tamiflu] should not be routinely
prescribed”.
“No one really knows if Tamiflu will
significantly reduce transmission; the
expectation is it will, but we don’t know for
sure”.
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media commentary.16 This type of inﬂuence may be stronger for
more familiar health issues, such as cancer, as the public
response to emerging health risks is usually one of scepticism.30
Indeed, uptake of H1N1-speciﬁc vaccine during the pandemic
among those in clinical risk groups was only 37.6%,34 which
suggests that both the ofﬁcial vaccination campaign and any
media support for vaccination had limited impact.
There were several limitations to our study. Although this
sample was drawn from a large number of articles, the
number of academics actually commenting on the use of NI/
vaccine was small. More quotes may have been obtained if
the study period was extended to the end of the H1N1 pan-
demic in the UK, but any CoI would be less relevant after the
main decisions on pharmaceutical products were taken. While
newspaper articles provide a limited set of quotes, the actual
interviews with academic sources were undoubtedly longer
and may have contained more nuanced views than those
represented by the quotes. The deﬁnitions and coding of pro-
motion/rejection could be criticised as subjective, although
similar deﬁnitions have been used in other content analyses.35
Finally, we performed a comprehensive search for CoI, but
there may be further conﬂicts (disclosed or undisclosed) that
were not identiﬁed here.
Rather than trying to decrease commentary on public health
issues from academics with CoI, a pragmatic approach would be
to focus on the complete transparency of these interests36 and
allow readers in any capacity to judge comments from aca-
demics with these in mind. Indeed, there have been repeated
calls for journalists to investigate CoI in their quoted sources in
science articles.16 37 38 In the study by Moynihan et al,29 ﬁnan-
cial ties to drug manufacturers that were disclosed in the scien-
tiﬁc literature were only reported in 39% of the news stories. In
our analysis, disclosure was present in only 3% of articles,
which may reﬂect the more fast-moving nature of the pandemic
news coverage. In spite of potential logistical difﬁculties, we
echo Caulﬁeld16 in his demand that all “reporters should always
ask for and researchers should always offer information about
[ﬁnancial associations]”.
There are, admittedly, limitations to disclosure. Kassirer
points out that disclosure currently tells us nothing about the
magnitude of CoI.39 In addition, the interpretation of declared
CoI can be subtle, as the emphasis is on complete disclosure of
any CoI that may potentially inﬂuence an author outside of any
judgement of their actual inﬂuence.40 It is not known whether
this distinction would be appreciated by those unversed in the
particularities of scientiﬁc CoI declarations. Researchers may be
understandably reluctant to put this to the test as news stories
about scientiﬁc CoI are often high proﬁle. In a 10-year analysis
of news media coverage of scientiﬁc CoI, McCormas and
Simone found that nearly 1 in 10 stories appeared on the front
page, suggesting a high degree of newsworthiness.40 Finally,
journalists themselves may have undisclosed CoI that would
impede truly impartial reporting.16
Despite these obstacles, we would argue that undisclosed CoI
degrades public conﬁdence in medical research, to the detriment
of the whole scientiﬁc community. We would recommend that
these principles are extended to more settings. We call on all
academics to declare any potential CoI when providing com-
mentary to the mass media. We encourage journalists to ask for
and report any CoI in their interviewees, so that readers can
judge their comments in full light of the facts. As Caulﬁeld puts
it,16 complete transparency should now be the understood
standard practice. Through these measures, the academic voice
will retain its credibility in public health issues.
What is already known on this subject
▸ Considerable public funding was spent on vaccines and
antiviral medication during the 2009 to 2010 A/H1N1
pandemic.
▸ Subsequently, there were concerns over competing interests
of academics serving on scientiﬁc advisory committees
during the pandemic.
▸ Many academics also provide media commentary on
emerging health risks, and the media has been shown to
inﬂuence public risk perception and demand for new drugs.
What this study adds
▸ Academics with competing interests were more likely to
predict a higher risk to the public from the pandemic than
ofﬁcial agencies compared with those without any
competing interests.
▸ Academics promoting the use of antiviral medication were
more likely to have a competing interest than those not
commenting on its use.
▸ Given the evidence of competing interests among academics
providing media commentary, these should be declared
before media interviews in order for public health to retain
its independent voice.
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